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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

CALVIN W. CLAYTON, SR. , Trustee,
CALVIN W. CLAYTON, SR., and
WINIFRED U. CLAYTON, C. COMSTOCK
CLAYTON II, BRUCE U. CLAYTON,
CALVIN W. CLAYTON, JR., and
GERALDINE V. GRIFFITHS,
Plaintiffs,
-vsCALVIN A. BEHLE, Executor of the
Estate of C. Comstock Clayton,
Deceased; CALVIN A. BEHLE, T.
BOWRING WOODBURY and RALPH D.
COWAN, Trustees,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
CALVIN A. BEHLE,
EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE
OF C. COMSTOCK CLAYTON,
DECEASED.

Defendants.
-vs-

CASE NO.

14662

GERALDINE V. GRIFFITHS,
Cross-Plaintiff,
-vsCALVIN W. CLAYTON, SR., Trustee,
CALVIN W. CLAYTON, SR., C.
COMSTOCK CLAYTON II, BRUCE U.
CLAYTON and CALVIN W, CLAYTON, JR.
Cross-Defendants.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a case in equity whereby the Plaintiffs seek to
establish the validity of a certain trust instrument executed by
C. Comstock Clayton in 19 63 and to impress a constructive trust
upon 125 shares of Clayton-Macfarlane Company stock.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The defendants are first, the Executor of the Estate
of C. Comstock Clayton who holds 25 shares of the 12 5 shares in
dispute as part of undistributed residue of Mr. Clayton's estate
and secondly, the Trustees of the C. Comstock Clayton Foundation
which in 1969 received as a gift from Mr. Clayton 100 shares of
the disputed stock, and which as residuary beneficiary under
Mr. Clayton's Will would receive the other 25 shares of disputed
stock subject to this litigation.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE 3EL0W
The court held that the trust executed by C. Comstock
Clayton in 19 63 was a valid irrevocable trust and that the
beneficiaries of said trust are entitled to receive the 12 5 shares
of stock currently held by the Trustees of the C. Comstock Clayton
Foundation and/or the Executor of the C. Comstock Clayton Estate.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendants herein named seek to have the judgment of
the lower court set aside on the basis that the 196 3 Trust had
been properly terminated, and under the facts the equitable relief
sought by plaintiffs should be denied.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
C. Comstock Clayton, who was born and died a resident of •
Utah, owned one-half or 125 shares of all of the stock of the
Clayton-Macfarlane Company, a Utah corporation, whose principal
asset was and still is a 7,461 acre ranch in East Canyon, Utah.
(F.4 R.973).

C. Comstock Clayton left as heirs one son, Calvin

-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Whitney Clayton, Sr., three grandsons, Charles Comstock Clayton,
Bruce U. Clayton and Calvin Whitney Clayton, Jr., who are all
sons of Calvin Whitney Clayton, Sr.; one granddaughter, Geraldine
V. Griffiths (formerly Geraldine Robertson), the daughter of a
deceased daughter of C. Comstock Clayton.

Plaintiff, Winifred

U. Clayton, is the estranged wife of Calvin W. Clayton, Sr.
THE CLAYTON FAMILY TRUST AND ITS REVOCATION
On October 22, 1963, C. Comstock Clayton as Donor and Cotrustee and Calvin W. Clayton, Sr., his only son, as co-trustee
executed an instrument, entitled the CLAYTON FAMILY TRUST (Exhibit
1 below), which was drafted by Mario Ciullo, a Boston, Massachusetts
attorney employed by both Messrs. Clayton and the Clayton Securities
Company.

C. Comstock Clayton was referred to in said Trust as a

resident of the State of Utah. On November 1, 1963, pursuant to
a letter from Mr. Mario Ciullo dated October 23, 1963 (Exhibit 2
below), the 125 shares of Clayton-Macfarlane Company stock owned
by C. Comstock Clayton were transferred in Utah by Grant Macfarlane,
the president and transfer agent of said company and Mr. Clayton's
Utah attorney, to fund the Clayton Family Trust,and a new Certificate Number 26 (Exhibit 18 below) representing 125 shares and in
the name of the Clayton Family Trust was returned by Macfarlane to
Mr. Ciullo.

'

The beneficiaries of the Clayton Family Trust were C. Comstock
Clayton for life, then his son Calvin W. Clayton, Sr. for life,
and then the issue of Calvin W. Clayton, Sr.

This Trust was devoid
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

of any language as to its revocability or irrevocability.

It

did, however, contain language which would allow the trustee to
invade the principal to provide for the health, maintenance or
comfort of the two life beneficiaries.

(Exhibit 1 below).

On or about May 16, 1967, pursuant to a request by C.
Comstock Clayton that Stock Certificate Number 26, of the ClaytonMacfarlane Company be transferred to him personally, Grant Macfarlane
informed Mr. Clayton that he would transfer said stock if Calvin,
the other co-trustee, would join in the assignment of Certificate
Number 26.

(Ab. 23, R. 138). Pursuant to such indication, a stock

power appointing Grant Macfarlane attorney for the purpose of
transferring said stock on the books of the Clayton-Mcfarlane
company was executed by C. Comstock Clayton and Calvin W. Clayton
on May 16, 1967 (Exhibit 19 below).
On June 9, 1967, Stock Certificate Number 26 was cancelled
by Grant Macfarlane and Stock Certificate Number 39 (Exhibit 20
below) was issued and delivered to C. Comstock Clayton individually.
(F. 16 R. 975).
CLAYTON BENEFICIARY VOTING TRUST
3y letter to C. Comstock Clayton in Salt Lake City, Utah
dated July 12, 1967, (Exhibit 3 below), Mario Ciullo sent Mr. Clayton
an instrument prepared by Mr. Ciullo (Ab. 3, Tr. 17) called the
CLAYTON BENEFICIARY VOTING TRUST.

In the July 12, 1967 letter,

Mr. Ciullo asked Mr. Clayton to execute the trust before a Utah
notary public.

Also enclosed with this letter was Stock Certifi-
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cate Number 39 for 12 5 shares of Clayton-Macfarlane Company stock
(Exhibit 20 below).

Mr. Ciullo asked that Mr. Clayton endorse

and deliver this Stock Certificate to Grant Macfarlane along with
the Trust Instrument for transfer to the trust.

In this letter,

Mr. Ciullo further advised Comstock Clayton to keep the Trust
Certificate in Utah "because of possible legal complications. . .in
Massachusetts,'1 but asked for a letter from Mr. Macfarlane indicating that the transfer to the Trust had been made. Mo such
letter was ever received by

Mr. Ciullo. (Ab. 62 Tr. 407, 408).

On July 20, 1967, Stock Certificate Number 39 in the name of
C. Comstock Clayton individually was delivered to Grant Macfarlane
with an endorsement by Comstock Clayton.

(F. 17 R. 975) .

The 125 shares of stock were then issued as Certificate Number 40
in the name of the Clayton Beneficiary Voting Trust and delivered to
Mr. Clayton.

(F. 17 R. 975; Ab. 28 R. 162). On August 29, 1967,

C. Comstock Clayton as Donor and co-trustee executed and acknowledged
the Clayton Beneficiary Voting Trust.

(F. 18 R. 975). The benefici-

aries of this trust were to be C. Comstock Clayton for life; then
one-fifth of the remainder as follows:
1.

Calvin W. Clayton, Sr. and Winifred U. Clayton
jointly and with right of survivorship.

2.

Comstock Clayton II.

3.

Bruce U. Clayton

4.

Calvin W. Clayton, Jr.

5.

Geraldine V. Robertson (now Geraldine V. Griffiths)
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This trust, like the Clayton Family Trustf provided for the
invasion of the principal for the health, maintenance, or comfort
of C. Comstock Clayton during his life if in the discretion of
the trustees it was necessary.

(Exhibit 4 below).

But again,

no express power to revoke was included.
THE C. COMSTOCK CLAYTON TRUST
Shortly before the execution of the Clayton Beneficiary
Voting Trust, on June 18, 1967, C. Comstock Clayton executed a
third trust denominated the C. COMSTOCK CLAYTON TRUST.
below).

(Exhibit 6

This Trust was to be funded by $250,000 in cash and

securities and C. Comstock Clayton was Donor and co-trustee with
Mario Ciullo as co-trustee.

The beneficiaries under this Trust

were to be C. Comstock Clayton for his life; then Calvin W. Clayton,
Sr. and his wife, Winifred U. Clayton, for life; and then the
issue of Calvin W. Clayton, Sr. were to receive the income in per
stirpes shares until the youngest reached or would have reached
25 years of age at which time all principal and income would be
divided and distributed in per stirpes shares.

(Exhibit 6 below).

Two years later by letter of May 20, 1969 to Mario Ciullo,
C. Comstock Clayton wrote that said C. Comstock Clayton Trust had
never been activated because his granddaughter (cross-plaintiff
Geraldine V. Robertson (now Griffiths)) had not been included as
a beneficiary.

He further indicated his willingness to execute

and activate said trust if it was revised to include his granddaughter and her issue as beneficiaries and to have as the res the

-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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proceeds of a $250,000 subordinated loan made to Clayton Securities Company by C. Comstock Clayton•

(Exhibit 10 below).

Again,

Ciullo included no express power to revoke in the drafts of this
Trust.
THE C. COMSTOCK CLAYTON FOUNDATION
On June 1, 1968 C. Comstock Clayton, as Donor, and Calvin
A. Behle, T. Bowring Woodbury and Ralph D. Cowan, as Trustees,
executed a Trust Agreement establishing THE C. COMSTOCK CLAYTON
FOUNDATION.

(F.19 R.975).

The purpose of said Trust is to benefit

charitable, religious, scientific, literary or educational activities, and it has been used since its establishment primarily to
support the Utah Symphony Orchestra.

On or about February 5, 19 69,

Comstock Clayton alone endorsed Stock Certificate Number 40 which
had been issued in the name of the Clayton Beneficiary Voting
Trust, and asked Grant Macfarlane to cancel said certificate and
issue a new certificate in his name individually.
Ab.28 R.164).

(F.20 R.975;

While Mr. Macfarlane initially objected on the basis

that Calvin W. Clayton, Sr. had not endorsed the certificate, upon
Mr. Clayton's statement that the certificate had never been delivered to the Clayton Beneficiary Voting Trust and that the stock
was his alone and he had the right to have it transferred,
Mr. Macfarlane cancelled Stock Certificate Number 40 and issued
and delivered Stock Certificate Number 41 (Exhibit 22 below) for
125 shares of Clayton-Macfarlane Company stock to C. Comstock
Clayton individually (Ab.25 R.149).
On September 17, 19 69 C. Comstock Clayton presented Stock
Certificate Number 41 for cancellation to Vicci Eckhart, Grant
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Macfarlane's secretary, who, pursuant to Mr. Macfarlanefs instructions cancelled Certificate Number 41 and issued Certificate Number
4 2 for 25 shares of Clayton-Macfarlane Company stock to C. Comstock
Clayton individually (Exhibit 34 below) and Certificate Number 43
for 100 shares of said stock to the C. Comstock Clayton Foundation.
The original Certificate Number 4 3 (Exhibit 23 below) was erroneously
issued to the Clayton Beneficiary Voting Trust and was cancelled by
Miss Eckhart at that same time in favor of another Certificate
Number 43 to the Foundation.

(Exhibit 25 below; Ab.55-57 R.359-369.)

MR. CLAYTON'S LAST WILL
C. Comstock Clayton executed his Last Will and Testament on
September 30, 1969.

(Exhibit 29 below.)

The following were named

as beneficiaries in the following amounts or the equivalent under
said Will:
1.
2.

Mabel Clayton (wife)
Geraldine V. Robertson (granddaughter)

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Utah Symphony
Irving E. Clayton (brother)
Rae K. Jeppson (sister-in-law)
Calvin Whitney Clayton, Sr. (son)
Winifred U. Clayton (daughter-in-law)
Charles Comstock Clayton II (grandson)
Bruce Underwood Clayton (grandson)
Calvin Whitney Clayton, Jr. (grandson)
Mary Sanford McKahan
Shirley Elizabeth Horsley Bennetts
Kathryn V. McGoldrick
C. Comstock Clayton Foundation

-8-
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$50,000
all personal
property + $25,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
80,614
10,000
25,000
25,000
25,000
5,000
10,000
5,000
residue

By codicil dated December 31, 1970, Mr. Clayton added Effie Kelsey
as a beneficiary in the amount of $5,000.

(Exhibit 35 below.)

On October 21, 19 69 C. Comstock Clayton announced to the
Board of Trustees of the C. Comstock Clayton Foundation his donation
of 10 0 shares of Clayton-Macfarlane Company stock to the Foundation.
(Exhibit 30 below.)
On either October 7 or 13, 1969, the C. Comstock Clayton
Trust was executed by C. Comstock Clayton as Donor and co-trustee
and by Mario Ciullo as co-trustee.

(Exhibits 7 and 8 below.)

As

redrafted, the beneficiaries of the Trust were to be C. Comstock
Clayton for life; then Calvin W. Clayton and Geraldine V. Robertson
(now Griffiths) in equal shares for life; at the death of Calvin W.
Clayton to Winifred U. Clayton, his wife, for life; at the death of
the survivor of Calvin W. Clayton or Winifred U. Clayton to the issue
of Calvin W. Clayton per stirpes; at the death of Geraldine V.
Robertson to her issue per stirpes.

This Trust was to be funded by

$360,000 in promissory notes of the Clayton Securities Corporation
under a subordinated capital loan agreement with C. Comstock Clayton
and was eventually so funded in December of 1970 (Ab. 6 0 R. 390).
On December 7, 19 70 Mario Ciullo telephoned Calvin A. Behle
and Grant Macfarlane indicating that the shares of Clayton-Macfarlane
Company stock in dispute here were supposed to be held by a Massachusetts trust.

(Ab.50 R.325.)

This was the first indication

Mr. Behle had of any Massachusetts trusts.

(Ab.49 R.317.)

In

checking with C. Comstock Clayton on December 30, 19 70, Mr. Behle
was informed by Mr. Clayton that while there had been a trust in
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Massachusetts, he had never activated it. Mr. Macfarlane was
likewise so informed.

(Ab.28 R.164).

C. Comstock Clayton died on February 14, 1971 of cerebral
arteriosclerosis and thrombosis.

(Exhibit 16 below.)

On May 28, 1971 a creditor's claim for 125 shares of
Clayton-Macfarlane Company stock was filed on behalf of the six
beneficiaries of The Clayton Beneficiary Voting Trust only, by
Calvin W. Clayton as surviving co-trustee, with Appellant as Executor
appointed by the Probate Division of the District Court of Salt
Lake County, Utah.

(Exhibit 32 below.)

Said claim was denied by

the Executor of C. Comstock Clayton's estate on June 9, 19 71.
On December 23, 19 71, suit was filed in the District Court
of Salt Lake County by Calvin W. Clayton, Sr., Trustee, and Calvin
W. Clayton, Sr., Winifred U. Clayton, C. Comstock.Clayton II,
Bruce U. Clayton, Calvin W. Clayton, Jr. and Geraldine V. Griffiths
as plaintiffs, who were the beneficiaries of the 1967 Trust, to
have the Court declare that Calvin A. Behle, as Executor of the
Estate of C. Comstock Clayton and Calvin A. Behle, T. Bowring Woodbury and Ralph D. Cowan as Trustees of the C. Comstock Clayton
Foudation held 125 shares of Clayton-Macfarlane Company stock for
the benefit of the Clayton Family Trust or the Clayton Beneficiary
Voting Trust and to have said defendants transfer said stock to
Calvin W. Clayton, Sr. as surviving trustee of both trusts. (R.442.)
For ready reference, a concise table of key dates and
events as well as a table indicating the history of the shares of
Clayton-Macfarlane Company stock here in question are included as
Exhibits A and B.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
I.

II.

III.

IV.
V.

THE COURT BELOW FAILED TO CONSIDER THE EQUITABLE DEFENSES
RAISED 3Y APPELLANT, CALVIN A. BEHLE, EXECUTOR.
A.

Clean Hands

B.

Laches

THE ACTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS WOULD MAKE IT INEQUITABLE TO
GRANT THEM RELIEF AND THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES SHOULD BE
APPLIED TO DENY THEIR CLAIMS.
CALVIN AND HIS SONS SHOULD HAVE FILED A PROPER CLAIM WITH
THE EXECUTOR UNDER THE 1963 RANCH TRUST, AS THEY DID
TOGETHER WITH THEIR MOTHER AND COUSIN UNDER THE 19 67
RANCH TRUST.
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO MEET AND CARRY THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF.
IN ALL REMAINING ASPECTS OF THIS APPEAL, THE APPELLANT,
EXECUTOR ADOPTS THE POINTS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE APPELLANT
FOUNDATION IN THIS PLEA BEFORE EQUITY TO UPSET AT THE
BEHEST OF DECEDENT'S MASSACHUSETTS FAMILY THE TRUST FOR
THE BENEFIT OF THE PEOPLE OF UTAH WHICH MR. C. COMSTOCK CLAYTON
UNEQUIVOCALLY DESIRED TO IMPLEMENT.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE COURT BELOW FAILED TO CONSIDER THE
EQUITABLE DEFENSES RAISED BY APPELLANT,
CALVIN A. BEHLE, EXECUTOR
The court below, even though the question was presented

in the context of a motion for a jury trial and objections thereto,
failed to make a definitive ruling as to whether this action was
one in equity or in law. However, the fact that this is an action
in equity clearly appears on the face of the original complaint
filed by the six original plaintiffs who ask for declaratory relief
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to have the defendant-Executor and the defendants-Trustees hold
the shares of Clayton-Macfarlane Company stock, currently held by
them, as trustees for plaintiffs.

An action for declaratory relief

is an equitable action.

McDonald v. Midland Mining Co., 293 P.2d

911 (D.C.App. Cal. 1965).

And as stated in Tibbitts v. Fife, 328

P.2d 212, 214 (D.C.App. Cal. 1958), "Equity retains exclusive
jurisdiction of actions to establish and enforce trusts."
Since this is so clearly an action in equity, there can be
no doubt about the fact that all of the long established maxims
of equity apply to it. Two of said maxims are of particular importance in this case.

The first has been stated as "He who comes

into equity must come with clean hands."

The second, which is

sometimes said to include the first, has been stated as "Equity
aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights," and is
commonly known as the doctrine of "laches."
There can be little doubt that the judge below failed to
consider these defenses.

In a Motion to Amend Defendant's Answer,

filed on March 26, 197 6, defendants asked that they be allowed to
amend the pleadings, and particularly their Answer, to conform to
the evidence introduced at trial, by including the equitable
defenses of "lack of clean hands" and "laches." The judge denied
said motion stating that it had not been timely filed.

(R. 968, 970).

This alone contravenes the law as set forth in Rule 15(b), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that a motion to amend the
pleadings to conform to the evidence "...may be made upon motion
of any party at any time, even after judgment...."

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires that
certain defenses including "laches" be pleaded as an affirmative
defense but the defense of "unclean hands" is not included in
said rule.

However, Rule 8(c) is not independent of the other

Rules of Civil Procedure and must not be applied to defeat their
fundamental purpose.

Thus, the Supreme Court of Utah has said,

"It is true, as plaintiff insists, that Rule 8(c)
U.R.C.P., requires that affirmative defenses be
pleaded. It is a good rule whose purpose is to
have the issues to be tried clearly framed. But
it is not the only rule in the book of Rules of
Civil Procedure. They must all be looked to in
the light of their even more fundamental purpose
of liberalizing both pleading and procedure to
the end that the parties are afforded the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions
they have pertaining to their dispute. What they
are entitled to is notice of the issues raised
and an opportunity to meet them. When this is
accomplished, that is all that is required."
Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P,2d
86, 91 (1963).
That plaintiffs had notice of the issues of laches and unclean
hands cannot be doubted.

Plaintiffs were initially put on notice

verbally at a hearing held before the court on October 30, 1975
when the judge was considering a request for a jury trial and
whether or not this case was a case in equity.

Plaintiffs were

further and more clearly advised of these particular issues during
the trial of this action when it became apparent to all that
Calvin W. Clayton, Sr. had engaged in the actions, described hereafter, which give rise to these equitable defenses.

And, if any

doubt still existed in the minds of plaintiffs as to the reliance
of defendants upon these equitable defenses, defendants1 Trial Brief,
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filed pursuant to the order of the court at the conclusion of
the trial of this matter, would have extinguished any doubt.

In

Point IV of said Brief, entitled "Plaintiffs1 Claimed Relief is
Inequitable," plaintiffs are put on notice of defendants1 reliance
upon equitable defenses, particularly that of the "clean hands
doctrine."

Thus, it is clear that plaintiffs were on notice and

certainly had the opportunity at trial as well as in subsequent
proceedings to meet these issues, which is all that is required
under the law*
A.

Clean Hands

The maxim that "He who comes into equity must come with
clean hands" is a basic and fundamental precept of equity jurisprudence-

Park v. Jameson, 12 Utah 2d 141, 364 P.2d 1 (1961);

27 AmJur 2d, Equity, §136, p.666; 4 A.L.R. 44; 30 C.J.S., Equity,
§93, p.1008. Stated simply it requires that anyone seeking enforcement of any claim in equity must come to the bar of the court of
equity without inequitable conduct on his part.

Otherwise the

court will refuse to lend its aid to his claim.

This maxim has

been more specifically defined as follows:
"The meaning of the maxim is that a party to
a suit in equity, in order to obtain the relief
sought, must not have been guilty of reprehensible
conduct directly connected with the matter in
controversy, and that any litigant who is at
fault in this respect will not receive the aid of >
a court of equity in the protection of any rights
which he may claim relating to the matter of the
suit." 4 ALR 44, 47.
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"It means that whenever a party who seeks to
set the judicial machinery in motion and obtain
some equity remedy has violated conscience or
good faith, or other equitable principle in his
prior conduct with reference to the subject in
issue, the doors of equity will be shut against
him notwithstanding the defendant's conduct has
been such that in the absence of circumstances
supporting the application of the maxim, equity
might have awarded relief." 2 7 AmJur 2d, Equity,
§137, p.670.
"It means that equity refuses to lend its aid in
any manner to one seeking its active interposition
who has been guilty of unlawful or inequitable
conduct in the matter with relation to which he
seeks relief." 30 C.J.S. Equity, §93, p.1009.
Case law in virtually all jurisdictions reflects similar definitions
of the maxim, and the Utah Supreme Court has said, "A court of
equity is a court of conscience, and anyone appealing to or asking
the aid of such court should come into it with clean hands and be
willing to do equity."

Shell Oil Co., v. Steffler, 87 Utah 176

48 P.2d 503, 509 (1935); Swanson v. Sims, 51 Utah 485, 496, 170
P.2d 774 (1918).
As indicated above, this is an equitable action since

the

plaintiffs seek declaratory relief by asking the court to require
the defendants to hold certain property in trust for them.

Thus,

the clean hands doctrine, a fundamental maxim in equity, should
have been considered by the Court.
While this maxim was not specifically raised as a defense
in the defendants1 Answer to plaintiffs1 complaint, it should
nevertheless have been considered by the judge below since, as
indicated above, both the judge and the plaintiffs had adequate
notice of defendants1 reliance upon said defense and its application
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to this case.

Generally, it has been said that the "clean hands"

maxim may be invoked by a party who has not pleaded it.

27 Am Jur

2d, Equity, §136, p.668; Dickerson v. Murfield, 147 P.2d 194
(S.Ct. Ore. 1944).

As stated in 4 A.L.R. 44, 47:

"The maxim need not be pleaded, for when the
evidence discloses the unconscionable character
of a transaction, the court, whether the maxim
is pleaded or not, will of its own motion apply
the principle involved therein."
In other words, the maxim is applied to protect the public and
the integrity of the court, 30 C.J.S. Equity, §9 3 p.1012, and where
the facts presented to a Court of equity raise the question of a
plaintifffs own misconduct in appearing to invoke the court's aid,
the court of its own motion must consider the facts of plaintiff's
case with regard to the cleanliness of his hands. Or, as stated
in 30 C.J.S., Equity, §93, p.1013:
"Whether parties are within the application
of the maxim is primarily a question of fact,
and the court, on any suggestion that a
plaintiff has not acted in good faith concerning matters on which he bases his suit, must
inquire into the facts in that respect."
The facts, which form the background of this action, as they
developed in discovery and at the trial, demonstrate the obvious
reasons for which the clean hands doctrine should be applied to
reject plaintiffs' claim.

The record clearly reflects that in 1963

Calvin W. Clayton, Sr. entered into a trust agreement as co-trustee
with his father, C. Cornstock Clayton.

This trust was funded by the

125 shares of Clayton-MacFarlane Company stock here in question
which were owned by C. Comstock Clayton and donated by him to the
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Trust.

Four of the plaintiffs claim, as part of their action

herein, that said trust was irrevocable since no express words
of revocation were included*

They further assert that the res

of said Trust was converted by C. Comstock Clayton in breach of
his fiduciary duties as trustee.

Defendant Behle, as Executor,

specifically denies that said res was convereted by C. Comstock
Clayton, in breach of his fiduciary duties, and adopts the brief
of Appellant Foundations trustees with respect to revocability.
Further, it is clear that decedent's son, Calvin W. Clayton, Sr.
knew of the transfer of said res to C. Comstock Clayton, his father,
and in fact actively participated in the transfer of the res as
well as in setting up the Clayton Beneficiary Voting trust which
he knew was at one time intended to be funded by the same res.
This is affirmed by the testimony of Calvin W. Clayton, (Ab. 38
R. 239) and also by the fact that he, along with all five of the
other plaintiffs herein, believed that the 1963 Clayton Family
Trust had been revoked and therefore filed a creditor's claim with
appellant Executor in reliance only on the 1967 Clayton Beneficiary
Voting Trust.

(Exhibit 32 below.)

Plaintiff, Calvin Sr., along with the other plaintiffs in
this action, have asserted, in essence, that the revocation of the
1963 Trust was unlawful since the law of Massachusetts does not
allow revocation of a trust where no specific language reserves
said power.

If this is the law of Massachusetts, which appellant

Executor specifically denies, Calvin Sr. actively participated in
an unlawful act with respect to said res in endorsing Certificate
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Number 26 for transfer tc C. Comstock Clayton and in acting as
a trustee for the Clayton Beneficiary Voting Trust which was, as
Calvin knew, to be funded by the same res.
Calvin's conduct clearly flies in the face of the following
definition from 27 Am Jur 2d, Equity, §137, p.669:
"!Clean hands1 is a legal euphemism which
refers to the acceptability, cleanliness,
and decency of the claim put forth."
His conduct more closely relates to this definition from the same
source:
"Within the purview of the maxim, the hands
of the litigant are rendered unclean by conduct
which is 'condemned and pronounced wrongful
by honest and fair minded men.'"
27 Am Jur
2d, Equity, §138, p.672.
and was described as follows in Seal v. Seal, 212 Kan. 55, 510
p.2d 167, 173 (Kan. 1973):
"That status (of having unclean hands) is
acquired by 'willful conduct which is
fraudulent, illegal, or unconscionable."
(Parentheses and emphasis ours).
Furthermore, that the court below should have denied relief to
Calvin, Sr. based on his conduct is supported by the following:
"Relief will be denied where it appears that
the right upon which the complainant relies
has grown out of a wrong, a breach of duty,
or a violation of law.... Furthermore, a
party will not be relieved from the consequences
of his own fraud or wrong or be given the aid
of equity to right his own wrong." (Emphasis added)
27 Am Jur 2d, Equity, §138, pp.672, 674.
"'Any really unconscientious conduct connected
with the controversy, to which he is a party,
will repel him from the forum whose very foundation is good conscience.1 1 Pomeroy, Equity
Jurisprudence §404. *** But where conduct,
in addition to being unconscionable, is also
illegal, a court of equity will, of course,
refuse its aid to any person or persons guilty
thereof." 4 A.L.R. 63 (Emphasis ours).
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Or, as stated in Weegham v. Killefer, 215 Fed. 171 (1914):
"Under this maxim any willful act in regard to
the matter in litigation which would be condemned
and pronounced wrongful by honest and fairminded
men will be sufficient to make the hands of the
applicant unclean. Both courts and text writers
have repeatedly spoken upon this subject in no
uncertain language.... He who has acted in bad
faith, resorted to trickery and deception, or
been guilty of fraud, injustice, or unfairness,
will appeal in vain to a court of conscience,
even though in his wrongdoings he may have kept
himself strictly 'within the law1."
While Calvin W. Clayton, Sr.'s conduct is obviously of such
a nature as to preclude him from relief in equity, his conduct and
its unconscionability are compounded by the involvement and activities
of Mario Ciullo with respect to said trusts. Mr. Ciullo admits that
he is personally interested in the outcome of this action.
R.64).

(Ab.ll

Mr. Ciullo further testified at trial that he considered

himself an expert in the law of trusts in Massachusetts and was
accepted by the court below as just such an expert.

(Ab5R.28).

It is clear from the record that Mr. Ciullo was the scrivener
of several trusts involving C. Comstcck Clayton as donor and trustee
and Calvin W. Clayton, Sr. or himself as co-trustee, including the
Clayton Family Trust, the Clayton Beneficiary Voting Trust, and
the C. Cornstock Clayton Trust. Thus, Ciullo, the trust expert,
participated in what has been described by the plaintiffs as the
conversion of the trust res from the Clayton Family Trust. His
only reservation in doing so, apparently was his statement to
C. Cornstock Clayton, as part of his letter outlining what needed
to be done to activate the Clayton Beneficiary Voting Trust and
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to transfer the stock in said Trust, that the trust certificate
should be kept in Utah because of "possible legal complications11
in Massachusetts.

The fact that Mr. Ciullo failed clearly to

inform his client, Mr. Clayton, that such a transfer was, as he
and the plaintiffs now assert, against the law, and the fact
that Ciullo actively participated in preparing the documents
which led to what plaintiffs call Mr. Clayton's conversion, all
indicate that other unclean hands besides Calvin W. Clayton, Sr.'s
were at work.
The record makes it clear that the other beneficiaries
under the 1963 Clayton Family Trust did not directly participate
in the revocation of or expressly waive their interests in the
196 3 Trust. However, such specific participation or waiver is
not always a requirement to show a lack of clean hands on the
part of such beneficiaries particularly where they by virtue of
their family relationship are in privity with their father as a
beneficiary.

Thus, it has been said:

"It has been pronounced that where a plaintiff
comes into equity for relief, he and those in
privity with him must be free of any inequitable
conduct relative to the controversy. It has been
held that although all members of a group suing
as plaintiffs are not guilty of unconscionable
conduct, they cannot claim the benefit of a fraud
perpetrated by one or two of their number. If
the maxim is applicable to the conduct of the
individual, relief will be denied to his heirs
or personal representative." 27 Am Jur 2d,
Equity, §136, p.667.
The conclusion to be drawn with respect to the application
of the "clean hands" doctrine to the fact of this case is that
Calvin W. Clayton, Sr., aided by an attorney who served both himself
and his father and who still serves Calvin, participated in what
-20-
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Calvin himself has described as a wrongful and illegal conversion
of the 125 shares of stock in question here.

In spite of his

participation in these actions, he now comes to a court of equity
seeking to avoid the consequences of his illegal conduct and to
take advantage of a trust which he helped to revoke. To allow his
claim would be unconscionable and in derogation of the court's
duty to avoid aiding a wrongdoer.

At the

very least the court

below should have denied any claim by Calvin W. Clayton, Sr. to
the stock in question here. However, the taint of Calvin's unclean
hands likewise appears on the hands of his sons, the other
beneficiaries under the 1963 Trust.

Calvin, who was clearly in

privity with them and who might be described as their agent
or guardian, through his partnership in what all plaintiffs claim
was wrongful and illegal conduct, makes it unconscionable for
them now to claim the benefit of the 1963 Trust.
B.

Laches.

The doctrine of laches has been defined in various ways
including the following:
"Laches is a purely equitable doctrine which is
frequently tented the 'doctrine of stale demand.'
The doctrine of laches may be defined generally
as a rule of equity by which equitable relief
is denied to one who has been guilty of unconscionable delay, as shown by surrounding facts and circumstances, in seeking relief. 'Laches' has been
defined as such neglect or omission to assert a
right, taken in conjunction with lapse of time
and other circumstances causing prejudice to an
adverse party, as will operate in a bar in equity."
27 Am Jur 2d, Equity, §152, p.687.
As indicated by this quotation, laches is an equitable
doctrine.

While equity courts had no specific statute of limita-

tions because such were statutory only, they frequently relied
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upon the doctrine of laches to refuse relief where there had
been an unreasonable and unexplained delay in prosecuting a
claim.

Equity/ George L. Clark, 1954. Courts of equity still

apply the doctrine of laches where warranted.

Thus, the United

States Supreme Court has said:
"...there is a defense peculiar to courts of
equity founded on lapse of time and the staleness of the claim, where no statute of limitations
governs the case. In such cases, courts of equity
act upon their own inherent doctrine of discouraging, fcr the peace of society, antiquated demands,
refuse to interfere where there has been gross
laches in prosecuting the claim, or long acquiescense in the assertion of adverse rights."
Badger v. Badger, 2 Wall. 87, 94, 17 L.Ed 836
(1864).
As earlier indicated, the doctrine of laches is closely
akin to and based upon maxims of equity similar to those supporting
the "clean hands" doctrine.

Thus, it has been said:

"Laches is founded principally upon the equitable
maxims, fhe who seeks equity must do equity,1
'he who comes into equity must come with clean
hands,' and 'equity aids the vigilant, not those
who sleep on their rights.' The basis of the
doctrine of laches is said to be public policy,
which requires, for the peace of society, the
discouragement of stale demands." 27 Am Jur 2d,
Equity, §153, p.689.
As a general rule it may be said that the beneficiary of
a trust may be precluded from recovery in any action for relief
based upon the trust of which he is a beneficiary where all of
the elements supporting the doctrine of laches appear.

Thus, it

has been said:
"Laches of the beneficiary. A beneficiary may be
barred by his laches from holding the trustee
liable for a breach of trust. He is so barred if
he fails to sue the trustee for the breach of trust
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for so long a time and under such circumstances
that it would be inequitable to permit him to hold
the trustee liable. Among the circumstances which
are of importance are the length of time during
which the beneficiary has delayed in bringing a
proceeding against the trustee; the change of circumstances, if any, between the commission of the
breach of trust and the bringing of the proceeding,
such as the death of witnesses or parties, or a
change of position by the trustees. The notion
of the barring of suit because of laches is the
general idea that it is in accordance with public
policy that suits should be brought with reasonable
promptness. There is also the idea that after the
lapse of a long period of time, it is difficult to
ascertain the truth. There is also the idea of
hardship to the defendant in pressing stale claims
against him, although the hardship to him may be
outweighed by the hardship to the plaintiff in
denying him redress." Scott on Trusts, §219, p.1755.
See also, Restatement 2d, Trusts, §219, p.511; Lulay
v. Lulay, 429 P.2d 802, (S.Ct.Ore. 1967).
Time is an important factor to consider in determining
whether laches applies to a particular case. Thus, it has been
said, "lapse of time is an important, indeed, an essential element
of laches."

30A C.J.S., Equity, §116, p.45.

However, time alone

is not the only factor which is important to the doctrine of laches.
Unlike statutes of limitations which are triggered by the passage
of time alone, laches requires more. As stated in 27 Am Jur 2d,
Equity, §163, p.703:
"Laches is not, as is a statutory period of
limitations, a mere matter of elapsed time,
but is principally a question of the inequity
of permitting the claim to be enforced—an
inequity founded upon some change in the
conditions or relations of the property or
the parties."
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II.
THE ACTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS WOULD MAKE
IT INEQUITABLE TO GRANT THEM RELIEF
AND THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES SHOULD BE
APPLIED TO DENY THEIR CLAIMS
There can be no doubt that the doctrine of laches should
be applied in this case to preclude plaintiffs1 recovery since
the two elements required to invoke laches are present. First,
there has been an extended period of time between the time at
which the cause of action arose and the time when plaintiffs
brought this action.

Second, other factors clearly indicate that

recovery by plaintiffs, at this late date, would produce inequitable results.
In a case similar in many respects to the one at issue
here, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed a
demurrer based upon laches which was granted by a lower court
against a petitioner who alleged an oral trust and sought the
proceeds thereof.

The petitionees deceased uncle was said to

have received an assignment of property to secure a $5,000 debt
owed him by his nephew.

The uncle received a large excess over

and above the $5,0 00 and, though requested by the plaintiff to
make an accounting, the uncle refused to do so and said he would
hold the excess in trust for petitioner's wife and child.

The

petitioner alleged that his failure to file any cause of action
was due to his subserviency to his uncle and his reliance upon
his uncle's promise to hold the property for petitioner's wife
and child.

The Court cited the long delay and the death of the

trustee "whose testimony must have been material" and said:
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"But where the trustee has repudiated his
obligations as trustee and holds adversely, a
beneficiary with knowledge of the repudiation
can no longer rely upon the trustee's continued performance of his duty* The beneficiary is then in a position similar to that
of any other party who has an equitable claim
against an adversary and may become barred by
laches if he fails to proceed with reasonable
diligence." Chandler v. Lally, 31 N.E.2d 1,
(S.Jud.Ct. Mass. 1941).
This case, decided under Massachusetts law with which plaintiffs
and their attorney, Mr. Ciullo, should have been familiar, is
dispositive of the case now before the court.

The only excuse

raised by Calvin W. Clayton, Sr. for his delay in bringing any
action or for his action in revoking the Clayton Family Trust
was his subserviency to his father and his belief that his father
could do what he wanted because it was his property.

(R.249, 250.)

On the other hand, Calvin knew that the Clayton Family Trust was
irrevocable because Mario Ciullo told him so (Ab.3 R.14) yet Calvin
actively participated to revoke said trust.
The time period during which a plaintiff has delayed in
asserting his rights is to be measured from the date of the injury.
Or as stated in 30A C.J.S., Equity, §116, p.59:
"In ascertaining whether relief should be
refused because of laches, lapse of time
should generally be considered as running
from the date when the alleged legal injury
occurred."
As stated in their Complaint, (R.442) and their Amended Complaint
(R.551), the plaintiffs in this case allege to have been injured
when,
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"On or about June 9, 1967, C. Comstock Clayton
in breach of his fiduciary duties and without
the knowledge or consent of Calvin W. Clayton,
Sr., the other trustee, or any of the beneficiaries of the Clayton Family Trust did
wrongfully and fraudulently withdraw and
convert to his own use said 125 shares of
Clayton-MacFarlane Company capital stock from
the said Clayton Family Trust and had said
shares of stock transferred and delivered to
himself, individually, as C. Comstock Clayton."
Thus, it would appear that the period of delay began on June 9,
IS67 and ended when plaintiffs filed their complaint on December
28, 1971. This four and one-half year delay evidences a disregard
of plaintiffs' claimed right to assert a claim against C. Comstock
Clayton for the alleged breach of trust and their responsibility
to do so.
The equitable doctrine of laches is not so strict as to
disregard plaintiffs1 delay when it has been brought about by
ignorance, incapacity or other excusable factors.
Thus, it has been said that, "In order for laches to be
a valid defense, it is held that the delay must be unexplained
and inexcusable."

27 Am Jur 2d, Equity, §164, p.705. Plaintiff

must have known or had the opportunity to find out about the
alleged injury and to assert his rights with respect thereto,
and then done nothing about it.
p.710.

See 27 Am Jur 2d, Equity, §167

That this principal is applicable in Utah and with

respect to beneficiaries who claim that their rights under a
trust have been abused was made clear by this Court in Acott v.
Tomlinson, 9 Utah 2d, 337 P.2d 720, 724 (1959), where it said:
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"Contributory negligence or even stupidity on
the part of the beneficiary of a trust in not
discovering his rights are being abused is
not a basis for the application of laches....
That defense is only available against a beneficiary who knows, or the circumstances are
such that he must be charged with knowledge of
the trustee's breach, or of his repudiation of
the trust, and who so long delays in bringing
suit that it would be inequitable to hold the
trustee." See also Walker v. Walker, 17 Utah
2d 53, 404 P.2d 253 (1965); Child v. Child,
8 Utah 2d 261, 332 P.2d 981 (1958); Berniker
v. Berniker, 174 p.2d 668 (D.C. App. Cal. 1947);
Davies v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,
63 P.2d 529 (Wash. 1937); McCallum v. Anderson,
147 F.2d 811, (10th Cir. 1945); Restatement 2d,
Trusts, §219, p.513.
In spite of the assertion in plaintiffs1 Amended Complaint
that C. Comstock Clayton transferred the 125 shares of ClaytonMacfarlane Company stock without their knowledge, the record fails
to support this

Calvin W. Clayton, Sr. unequivocably stated on

the witness stand that he signed the certificate of stock issued
to the Clayton Family Trust in order to transfer it to the Clayton
Beneficiary Voting Trust and that he executed the Voting Trust
having full knowledge of its provisions and their affect on his
interests.

(Ab. 38 R. 239).

had advised Calvin
(Ab. 3 R. 14) .

And Mario Ciullo stated that he

that the Clayton Family Trust was irrevocable.

There can be no doubt therefore that not only

was Calvin aware of the repudiation of the Clayton Family Trust,
of which he now complains, but he participated as a trustee in
said repudiation in spite of the fact that his attorney had
advised him that said trust was irrevocable.
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Therefore, the conclusion which must be reached is
that since Calvin knew of and participated in the revocation
of the Clayton Family Trust, which he had been advised was
illegal, he knew or was on notice to find out about such a
repudiation and the time for him to assert his rights accrued
when he knew that Comstock had signed or was prepared to sign
the stock certificate and the Clayton Beneficiary Voting
Trust,
While the record appears to indicate that Calvinfs three
sons as the other beneficiaries of the Clayton Family Trust had
no clear knowledge at least until 1970 of its existence or the
repudiation in favor of the Clayton Beneficiary Voting Trust,
there is authority which suggests that Calvin's knowledge may
be imputed to his children and that the time during which no
action has been taken will apply to them as well.

Thus, it is

said:
"It has been held on the one hand that where
time has begun to run against the ancestor,
it continues to run against the heir, although
the latter is an infant or feme covert, ...."
30 C.J.S., Equity, §12 8, p.75,
"Since a party is generally charged with the
laches of his privies...or agents, ...it follows
that knowledge of an ancestor will be imputed
to an heir, . . .. " Id., p. 86.
This position is supported also by Rule 17(a), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, which vests in the trustee of a trust any
right of action for wrongs against trust property.
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In a recent

case in Idaho, Jones v. State, 432 P.2d 420, (S.Ct. Id. 1967),
the Supreme Court of that state held that where the trustee
of a trust involving a sale of real property in breach of trust
failed to act within the time required under the statute of
limitations, the minor beneficiaries of the trust were precluded
by said statute of limitations from suit for their interests
against those who purchased the property from those gaining title
through adverse possession.
In addition to a showing of a lapse of time, other factors
are important in determining whether plaintiffs1 laches will
preclude recovery.

As indicated above, plaintiff's delay in

asserting his rights must be excusable in order to allow him to
escape application of the laches doctrine.

However, only such

factors as age, competency, or lack of knowledge have been
allowed to show excusable neglect.

In the case at issue here,

Calvin W. Clayton, Sr., lacks any excuse for his laches. Obviously,
his age and competency were adequate and as pointed out above, he
not only had knowledge of his fatherfs repudiation of the Clayton
Family Trust, but he was a willing participant in spite of legal
advice that his action was illegal. And as indicated above, his
actions may be imputed to his children.

30A C.J.S., Equity,

§115, p.44 lists other factors to be considered in determining,
in any particular case, whether there are laches:
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"Other matters to be considered...include the
duration of the delay in asserting the claim, the
sufficiency of the excuse offered in extenuation
of the delay, whether plaintiff acquiesced in the
assertion or operation of the corresponding
adverse claim, whether the evidence of the matters
in dispute has been lost or become obscured,
whether the conditions have so changed as to
render the enforcement of the right inequitable,
whether third persons have acquired intervening
rights, the nature of the duty or obligation
sought to be enforced, and whether plaintiff or
defendant was in possession of the property in
suit during the delay.!t
The duration of the delay and the sufficiency of the excuse
offered having already been considered, further discussion is not
necessary except to say that upon showing evidence of said factors,
any of several presumptions may arise in favor of defendant as
described in 30A C.J.S., Equity, §116, p.60:
"Long lapse of time, if unexplained, may create
or justify a presumption against the existence or
validity of plaintiff1s right and in favor of the
adverse right of defendant; or a presumption that,
if plaintiff was ever possessed of a right, it has
been abandoned or waived, or has been in some manner
satisfied; ...or a presumption that the evidence
of the transaction in issue has been lost or become
obscured, ...or a presumption that the adverse
party would be prejudiced by the enforcement of
plaintiff's claim."
The question of "whether plaintiff acquiesced in the
assertion or operation" of the Clayton Beneficiary Voting Trust
is clearly answered by the claim made by all plaintiffs in their
Complaint, Amended Complaint and Claim of Creditors filed with
the Executor, Behle.

In all of these documents, plaintiffs assert

their rights to the stock in issue based upon the validity of the
1967 Clayton Beneficiary Voting Trust.

Thus, they accepted the
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alleged breach of which they now complain and relied upon it to
establish their rights under the 1967 trust.
That this is a proper element to consider with respect
to laches is made clear by the following:
11

Acquiesence in an adverse right is an important
element of laches. Where plaintiff has acquiesced
for an unreasonable length of time in the assertion
of operation of a right adverse to his own, equity
will not enforce his claim." 30A C.J.S., Equity/
§117, p.63.
The death of C. Comstock Clayton in early 19 71 and the
vague recollection of certain important events in the minds of
parties and important witnesses underline another factor which must
be weighed in the balance to determine whether plaintiffs should
be precluded in their claim because of their laches. Thus, it has
been said:
"A court of equity may refuse relief after inexcusable
delay because of the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of arriving at a safe and certain conclusion
as to the truth of the matters in controversy and
doing justice between the parties, where the evidence
has been lost or become obscured through the loss of
documents, or through death or disappearance of one
or more of the participants in the transaction in
suit or of the witnesses thereto, or through impairment of the memory of participants or witnesses still
living." 3 0A C.J.S., Equity, §118, p.69.
There can be no doubt that if C. Comstock Clayton were
alive today any question respecting his intent or his understanding
of the law concerning the trusts in question would be easily
established.

Further, any vagueness in the recollection of witnesses

or parties as to their statements to C. Comstock Clayton or his
intent would be clarified.

However, with the death of Mr. Clayton,
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important testimony and guidance in gathering evidence and
establishing a defense has been lost to the defendants.

As the

Supreme Court of Hawaii said:
"In an action against a trustee for breach
of trust, death of a material witness during
the period that a beneficiary has delayed
in bringing his action is an important circumstance to be considered in determining
whether the beneficiary is guilty of laches."
Brown v. Bishop Trust Company, 355 P.2d 179
(1960).
Another factor which must be considered is whether third
persons have acquired intervening rights.

If such is the case and

if by enforcing the plaintiffs1 claim such rights would be injured,
a court of equity will refuse to grant relief.

As stated in

30A C.J.S., Equity, §118, p.68:
"A court of equity will refuse to act where,
in the course of an inexcusable delay, third
persons have acquired rights in the subject
matter of the controversy which would be injuriously affected by the granting of relief."
The style of this case indicates that Geraldine V. Griffiths is
seeking recovery under the 19 67 Clayton Beneficiary Voting Trust
and the trustee defendants represent a charitable foundation
created by C. Comstock Clayton to support, among other things,
the arts in Utah.

Thus, Geraldine Griffiths as well as all people

interested in the advancement of the arts in Utah have acquired
intervening interests in the subject of this lawsuit which is the
res of the Clayton Family Trust and all would be prejudiced through
no fault of theirs by a finding which would allow plaintiffs to
recover the stock in question.
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Closely associated with the question of intervening rights
is the question of "whether conditions have so changed as to render
the enforcement of this right inequitable."

That this consideration

is important is indicated by language from 30A C.J.S., Equity,
§118, p.65, where it is stated:
"Injury or prejudice resulting from the granting
of relief to the adverse party is an important
element of laches; and where prejudicial changes
in conditions have occurred during plaintiff's
delay in asserting his right, it will be barred
for laches."
Obviously the arts in Utah in which Mr. Clayton was keenly interested
will be advanced and aided by the use of the stock in question and
enforcement of plaintiffs1 claim would be prejudicial to the recipients
of Foundation aid.

While this, in and of itself, is important to

consider, an equcilly important consideration is that the entire
estate plan of C. Comstock Clayton would be set aside by granting
plaintiffs1 requested relief.
In the first place, it is clear from the various documents
in evidence and from the trial transcript that during his lifetime
C. Comstock Clayton had in mind benefitting his only living child,
Calvin, his grandsons, Bruce, Calvin and Charles, his granddaughter,
Geraldine, Calvin's wife, Winifred, and the arts.

Thus, while in

the Clayton Family Trust he had provided only for Calvin arid his
sons, in the Clayton Beneficiary Voting Trust, after Calvin and his
wife, Winifred, were at odds, Comstock provided for Winifred
separately and also included Geraldine who had been left out of
the Family Trust. That his desire was to provide for these two
beneficiaries is clear by his insistence that they be included in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the C. Comstock Clayton Trust which was drafted at approximately
the same time as the Clayton Beneficiary Voting Trust.

This

insistence is pointed out by his letter to Mario Ciullo dated
May 2 0, 1969 (Exhibit 10 below) in which he indicates his willingness to execute the C. Comstock Clayton Trust if and when these
two beneficiaries are added.
The fact that Mr. Clayton was concerned and interested in
the Arts in Utah appears not only from the fact that he set up
the C. Comstock Clayton Foundation for this purpose, but also
from the fact that he made said Foundation the residuary beneficiary
under his Will in which he included as beneficiaries all of the
plaintiffs herein as well as others.
Another aspect of the change in conditions since the date
of the Clayton Family Trust is the fact that all of the plaintiffs
herein have been provided for through the C. Comstock Clayton
Trust and the Will of Mr. Clayton in amounts equal to or in excess
of that which they could claim as beneficiaries of the Clayton
Family Trust.

Thus, pursuant to the terms of the C. Comstock

Clayton Trust (a Trust funded with a $360,000 subordinated loan),
after the life estate of C. Comstock Clayton, Calvin W. Clayton, Sr.,
and Geraldine V. Robertson (now Griffiths) share a life estate.
At the death of Calvin W. Clayton, Sr., his wife, Winifred, will
receive his share for life and at the death of Calvin W. Clayton,
Sr. and Winifred, their issue are to receive their share in per
stirpes shares.

At the death of Geraldine, her issue will receive

her share in per stirpes shares.

And under the terms of C. Comstock
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Clayton's Last Will and Testament, the parties herein have received
in cash or the equivalent thereof the following:
Geraldine V. Robertson (now Griffiths) —
property plus $25,000

All personal

Winifred U. Clayton -- $10,000
Charles Comstock Clayton II —
Bruce Underwood Clayton —
Calvin Whitney Clayton —

$25,000

$25,000
$25,000

Calvin Whitney Clayton, Sr. —

$80,614

C. Comstock Clayton Foundation — residue
These changes made by C. Comstock Clayton with respect to
his estate planning, bringing into the picture his granddaughter
and his daughter-in-law as well as the Clayton Foundation Trust,
have so radically changed the conditions which prevailed in 196 3
at the time the Clayton Family Trust was set up, that it would be
grossly inequitable to enforce plaintiffs1 claims in derrogation
of the clearly intended estate planning of Mr. Clayton. Such
would result in unjust enrichment of these particular four plaintiffs,
Calvin W. Clayton,.Sr. and his three sons, by allowing them to
receive twice what C. Comstock Clayton obviously planned to give
only once to them and would exclude the fourth grandchild, Geraldine,
and Calvin W. Clayton, Sr.'s estranged wife, Winifred.

And while

this Court has found that it would be unfair to apply the doctrine
of laches to deprive a plaintiff of the benefits of his planning,
Child v. Child, supra., so it would be unfair to impress a trust
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upon the stock in question here to deprive C. Comstock Clayton
of his planning.

As the Court said in Child, "He who plants

the crop should reap the harvest;" or in this case, "He who
earned the estate and directs its distribution should not be
frustrated in his efforts without good reason."

Again at the very

least the court below should have denied any claim made by Calvin
W. Clayton, Sr. since he knew of and participated in the repudiation
of the Clayton Family Trust and yet waited four and one-half years
and until his father was dead to complain of it.
III.
CALVIN CLAYTON, SR. AND HIS SONS SHOULD HAVE FILED
A PROPER CLAIM WITH THE EXECUTOR UNDER THE 1963
RANCH TRUST, AS THEY DID TOGETHER WITH THEIR
MOTHER AND COUSIN UNDER THE 196 7 RANCH TRUST
Section 75-9-4 is the legislators1 mandate in probate proceedings that "All claims arising upon contract, whether the same
are due, not due or contingent, must be presented within the time
limited in the notice, and any claim not presented is barred forever."
Plaintiffs, all six of them, timely filed in 1971 such a
claim with the Executor, seeking under the 19 67 contract with
decedent creating the Clayton Beneficiary Voting Trust to obtain
equitable relief by way of impressing a constructive trust on the
Ranch stock.

When in June the Executor under all the circumstances

denied this claim and put plaintiffs to their proof, this suit
under Section 75-9-9 was timely filed by all six in December of
that year, including recitals of submission of the claim to the
Executor, and its denial.

Section 75-9-11 explicitly provides that

"No holder of any claim against an estate shall maintain any action
thereon unless the claim is first presented to the executor...."
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In 1971 when the six plaintiffs filed their claim with
the Executor and brought this suit/ Calvin Sr., unequivocally
stated all along that he had read it "page by page" in 1963, and
some of Calvin's sons and their attorney, Ciullo, knew of the
1963 Trust.

Together at that time they all six elected to make

no claim under the 19 63 contract.

Instead, together they elected

to claim only under that of 1967. Not until April of 1973 when
the facts developed that the 1967 Trust had never been "activated"
or funded, did Calvin and his three sons bring out the new, but
really old, claim arising out of the 196 3 contract with the
Decedent.
In the meantime, Executor had relied upon the filing of
the claim arising out of the 196 7 contract.
In the old case of Hamilton v. Pooley, 15 Utah 280, 49 P. 769
(1897), this Court pointed out the difference between a creditor
seeking to recover an ordinary debt against the estate, and one
who is asserting an equitable claim or interest in property in the
executor's hands. This rule may very well apply here, and plaintiffs may have needlessly filed the claim under the 19 67 contract
under an erroneous impression, despite the statute, that such was
a condition precedent to filing this action.
An executor of course is under strict limitations as to
claims, and the point here is that while this Court might very
well determine the law to be that no claim had to be filed with
the executor in this case, as the Court below held, still this
emphasizes that plaintiffs coming to the bar of equity to seek
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relief are not entitled to such relief under the 196 3 Trust
when in 1971 they were all very well aware that the 19 63 Trust
had been revoked in fact by their benefactor in lieu of other
compensatory benefits which he had granted them and they had
accepted in lieu of the 1963 Trust; and when Calvin Clayton, Sr.,
the co-trustee and Ciullo and Macfarlane, Mr. Clayton's attorneys,
had actively participated in such revocation.

And to the extent

that the three sons understandably might not have known of the
196 3 Ranch Trust as their father did, at the time of its creation,
or of its revocation in 1967, by 1971 as adults they concurred in
the revocation when they elected to claim only under the 1967 Ranch
Trust and also accepted under the 1967 Charles Comstock Clayton
Trust, as well as the Will.
It should be noted that Winifred would not participate
in such conniving, for when she learned that the 1967 Ranch
Trust apparently had never been activated, and that in lieu of
the old 19 67 trust her father-in-law had set up both the Will
and the Charles Comstock Clayton Trust in which she would participate, she would not further participate in an action to frustrate
her benefactor's intent.
Not only is Decedent's clear intent frustrated by the decision
below and the claims still made for equitable relief in this Court,
but the Estate and Foundation which he left have been badly impaired by the consequences of the revival of the revoked 196 3
trust, which plaintiffs had helped, and knew had been, revoked,
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IV.
PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO MEET AND
CARRY THEIR BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING
THE VALIDITY OF THE CLAYTON FAMILY
TRUST BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE
Normally, in civil actions, the burden of proof in a
matter rests upon the party who asserts the affirmative of an
issue.

Thus, it has been said:
"The burden of proof in the strict sense of the
term, that is, the ultimate burden of establishing the truth of a given proposition of fact
essential to a cause of action or defense, rests
upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings
or the nature of the case, asserts the affirmative
of the issue, . . . .If 29 AmJur2d, Evidence, §127,
p.159.

This burden is the same in equity as at law.
30A C.J.S., Equity,

Or as stated in

§477, p.497:

"There is no difference with respect to the burden
of proof between proceedings at law and in equity;
in both, the party maintaining the affirmative
of the issue has it cast on him. The burden is
on the complainant to establish the truth of the
material and controverted allegations on which
he bases his right to relief, not withstanding
the fact that the bill waives an answer under oath."
And, particularly with respect to trusts, the burden is
upon he who would establish a trust to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that such a trust exists and is valid.

Or as the Supreme

Court of Montana has said:
"The burden of proof to establish the existence
of a trust...is upon the party who claims it.
Trusts must be founded on evidence which is unmistakable, clear, satisfactory and convincing."
First National Bank of Twin Bridges v. Sant, 161
Mont. 376, 506 P.2d 835, 841 (1973).
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It is clear from the record in the action before this
Court that plaintiffs have failed to meet and carry their burden.
The reliance in their Complaint and Amended Complaint upon both
the 1963 and 1967 Trusts casts the first shadow of ambiguity over
their proof.

This shadow was compounded when the light of truth

became obscured by the death of C. Comstock Clayton, the only
competent witness to speak of the matters here in question. The
apparent changes in Comstock Clayton's estate planning could only
be verified by his own testimony.

The vague recollections of

happenings in 1963 and 1967 by the witnesses before the court add
to the shadows. And finally the entire matter is blackened by the
apparent dealings of one of the principal beneficiaries of the
trusts in question and the Massachusetts attorney who drafted all
of the trust instruments before the Court and who failed to give
clear advice as to their effect.
So, far from being clear and convincing, the evidence
adduced by the plaintiffs is rendered unclear by all of the
testimony and exhibits produced by plaintiffs.

The lack of clarity

thus produced certainly falls short of what might be called
"convincing" evidence.
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V,
IN ALL REMAINING ASPECTS OF THIS APPEAL, THE
EXECUTOR ADOPTS THE POINTS AND ARGUMENTS OF
THE APPELLANT FOUNDATION IN THIS PLEA BEFORE
EQUITY TO UPSET AT THE BEHEST OF DECEDENT'S
MASSACHUSETTS FAMILY THE TRUST FOR THE BENEFIT
OF THE PEOPLE OF UTAH WHICH MR. CLAYTON SO UNEQUIVOCALLY DESIRED TO IMPLEMENT.
CONCLUSION
Appellant Executor adopts the argument of Appellants
Trustees that the 196 3 Clayton Family Trust was properly revoked
by C. Comstock Clayton. While this, in and of itself, should
have been enough to preclude plaintiffs from the recovery allowed
by the lower court, the conclusion is inescapable that the equities
of this case must bar the plaintiffs from said recovery.

Since

Equity will not countenance wrongdoing or aid a wrongdoer in obtaining the benefit of his wrongful acts, the court below clearly
erred when, in spite of clear indications of the illegal and unconscionable conduct of beneficiaries and others closely associated
with the trust in question, it permitted the distortion and destruction of C. Comstock Claytonfs estate planning by the unjust
enrichment of beneficiaries for whom he had otherwise provided.
DATED this

day of November, 1976.
Respectfully submitted,

JAMES B. LEE

JOSEPH W. ANDERSON
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Appellant
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EXHIBIT A

TABLE OF KEY DATES AND EVENTS
10/22/63

Clayton Family Trust (CFT) executed, and funded
(Stock Certificate No. 26).

5/16/67

Stock power to terminate CFT executed by C.
Comstock Clayton (CCC) and Calvin W. Clayton.

6/9/67

Stock Certificate No. 26 transferred from CFT
to CCC personally (Stock Certificate No. 39).

7/12/67

Clayton Beneficiary Voting Trust (CBVT) counterparts sent to CCC by Ciullo.

7/18/67

CCC executed C. Comstock Clayton Trust (CCCT).

7/20/67

CCC transferred Stock Certificate No. 39 to
CBVT (Stock Certificate No. 40) delivered to him.

8/29/67

CCC acknowledged CBVT before Macfarlane.

6/1/68

C. Comstock Clayton Foundation (CCC Foundation)
established and funded.

9/1/68

Last Will and Testament executed by CCC.

2/5/69

CCC transferred Stock Certificate No. 40 from
CBVT back to himself (Stock Certificate No. 41)•

5/20/69

CCC letter to Ciullo about redrafting and funding
CCC Trust.

9/17/69

CCC transferred 10 0 shares of Stock Certificate No. 41
to CCC Foundation (Stock Certificate No. 43).

10/7-13/69

CCC Trust as redrafted was executed by CCC and Ciullo,
co-trustees.

12/7/70

Ciullo phoned Macfarlane and Behle advising that the
Ranch Stock was supposed to be in a Massachusetts Trust,

Dec. 1970

CCC Trust funded.

12/30/70

CCC advised Behle that Massachusetts Trust had
never been activated

12/31/70

Codicil to Last Will executed.

2/14/71

Charles Comstock Clayton died.

June 1971

Claim filed with Executor under 1967 CBVT and denied.

12/23/71

Suit brought by the six beneficiaries of 1967 CBVT

Apr. 1973

Amended
Complaint
filed
alternatively
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EXHIBIT B
TABLE OF CLAYTON - MACFARLANE SHARES HISTORY

NAME OF OWNER

DATE OF EXECUTION
OF TRUSTS

STOCK CERTIFICATE NO.

DATE OF ISSUANCE
OF CERTIFICATE

DATE OF CANCELLATION

NEW OWNER and
CERTIFICATE NO.

CLAYTON FAMILY TRUST

October 22, 1963

No. 26
(125 shares)

November 1, 1963

June 9, 1967

C. Comstock Claytor
Certificate No. 39

No. 39
(125 shares)

June 9, 1967

July 20, 1967

Beneficiary Voting
Trust - Certificate
No. 40

No. 40
(125 shares)

July 20, 1967

February 5, 1969

C. Comstock Clayton
Certificate No. 41

C- COMSTOCK CLAYTON
(Individual)

No. 41
(125 shares)

Feb, 5, 1969

Sept. 17, 1969

25 shares/C. Comsto
Clay ton, Cer t. No.
and Clayton Foundat
100 shares - Certif:
No. 44

C. COMSTOCK CLAYTON
FOUNDATION

No. 43
(100 shares)

Sept. 17, 1969

Delivered to
Trustees

C. COMSTOCK CLAYTON
(Individual)

No. 42
(25 shares)

Sept. 17, 1969

In Decedent's
Estate Assets

C. COMSTOCK CLAYTON
(Individual)
BENEFICIARY VOTING
TRUST

July 20, 1967
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